In this paper we study a simple two-period asset pricing model to understand the implications of uninsurable labor income risk and/or borrowing constraints, limited stock market participation, heterogeneous labor income volatilities, and heterogeneous preferences. We appraise the performance of each of these in matching moments of asset returns to the data and show that limited stock market participation generates a significantly large equity premium. We also show that the distribution of wealth between stock market participants and non-participants plays an important role in asset pricing, and that the effect of borrowing constraints on asset returns are similar to that of limited participation. Finally, we discuss the practical implications of our investigation, providing an appraisal of ongoing changes in asset returns.
Introduction
In this paper we study a simple asset pricing model with ðiÞ uninsurable labor income risk and/or borrowing constraints, ðiiÞ limited stock market participation, ðiiiÞ heterogeneous income volatilities and ðivÞ heterogeneous preferences with a simple two-period two-agent model. The implications of these assumptions have been investigated in the asset pricing literature with, at most, three assumptions. In this paper we depart from the literature and take a comprehensive approach by considering all four assumptions together. A simple two-period two-agent model is flexible and tractable and thus allows one to investigate equilibrium by using various combinations of assumptions. Of course, the model has limitations, i.e., the two-period model does not allow to study asset pricing implications of long-run risk or business cycles 1 and the assumption of two agents does not allow to model large individual-specific labor income shocks and small aggregate risk simultaneously. Despite the limitations there exist aspects of asset pricing which can be captured by the two-period two-agent model, and we explore these aspects. Since the equity premium in a complete market representative agent economy is much lower and the risk-free rate is larger than the estimates from U.S. data (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1989) , researchers have proposed modifications of the complete market model such as market incompleteness (Lucas, 1994; Telmer, 1993; Constantinides and Duffie, 1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Weil, 1992) , habit formation (Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) , and limited stock market participation (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; He and Modest, 1995; Basak and http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.01.019 0378-4266/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
q We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and constructive suggestions. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2014S1A3A2036037). The research in this paper was supported by the WCU (World Class University) program through the National Research Foundation of Korea, which is funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (R31-20007) . Cuoco, 1998) . For example, Lucas (1994) , Telmer (1993) , and Weil (1992) have examined market incompleteness resulting from the existence of uninsurable income risk and concluded that it alone could not generate a high equity premium. Guvenen (2009) has investigated a production economy with two groups of agents with different elasticities of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and one of the two groups is excluded from the stock market. His model generates moments of equity returns that are close to the data. However, the validity of the model's assumptions is still questionable. In Guvenen (2009) , the relative shares of labor income of stock market participants and non-participants are set to be 0.2 and 0.8, respectively, reflecting the distribution of population but not that of labor income. Stock market participants are generally richer and earn higher income than non-participants. Also the non-participants save, i.e., take long positions in riskless bonds and the participants borrow as the counter party, i.e., take short positions in bonds and thus have highly leveraged positions in the risky asset in Guvenen (2009) . This is counterfactual, because the rich, who participate in the stock market, save far more than the poor, who are non-participants (Carrol, 2002a,b) .
The size of the equity premium remains controversial (see, e.g., Brown et al., 1995) , and some literature has reported mixed empirical evidence. 2 Despite the controversy about the size of the equity premium, the puzzle still remains. Furthermore, the ex-ante risk premium which theoretical models imply that investors require is worth knowing. In this paper we use a simple two-period economy to study the implications of the major modifications to the complete market model simultaneously for equilibrium asset returns. Our objective is to examine sources of the high equity premium and the low risk-free rate. We consider an economy with two agents ('1' and '2') who have Epstein-Zin type preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989) . This economy has two trees; the first is fully tradable and the second may not be. We refer to the dividend from the second tree as labor income. Each agent owns a share of each tree as an initial endowment.
We start by showing that if the shares of labor income are freely tradable and thus the financial market is complete, the asset returns are similar to those in Mehra and Prescott (1985) under reasonable parameter values. This result implies that our two-period model generates results not very far from those of the standard models. We call this complete market case Model 0.
Next, we present Model I, in which labor income is non-tradable. In Model I, both agents participate in the stock market, as in Model 0. The equity premium and the risk-free rate generated from Model I are fairly comparable to those of Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994) , which show that the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle cannot be resolved by market incompleteness due to non-tradable labor income and borrowing constraints. The Sharpe ratio and the volatility of consumption growth rate in Model I are also similar to those in the incomplete market asset pricing literature. The similarities of our results from Models 0 and I to those in the previous literature confirms that our two-period model can capture the essence of asset pricing despite the model's relatively short time horizon.
With the previous two cases in mind, we present Model II, in which only agent 1 is allowed to participate in the stock market while agent 2 is not. We show that a significant portion of the equity premium can be explained by limited stock market participation; that is, the equity premium in Model II is fairly large. All other moments of asset returns generated by Model II match the data better than do those of Model 0 and Model I. The intuition behind the greater performance of Model II has been provided already by Guvenen (2009) : stock market participants take the whole risk from dividends and therefore require a high risk premium. In contrast, in Model II, the participants' demand for bonds is lower than in Model I (in which stock market participation is not limited). The results for Model II are consistent with those of Guvenen (2009) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008) and show that our two-period model can generate asset return moments comparable to those in multi-period models.
However, the better performance of Model II than Models 0 and I in matching data is true only when the share of labor income owned by stock market participants is small, e.g., 20% of the total. Based on the empirical fact that stock market participants are generally richer and have much higher per capita income than non-participants, we test the validity of the result with a new distribution of labor income, 0.5:0.5. In this case, limited stock market participation explains a smaller portion of the equity premium than it does with a distribution of 0.2:0.8. Gomes and Michaelides (2008) have also argued that limited stock market participation plays a negligible role in explaining the high equity premium if non-participants' wealth is much smaller than that of participants.
After identifying the effect of uninsurable income risk and limited stock market participation, we continue to study the effect of the heterogeneity of agents' income volatilities and preferences on asset pricing. We show that heterogeneity, either of income volatilities or of preferences, does not play a significant role in matching asset pricing moments. With respect to labor income volatilities, we show that an increase in heterogeneity does not affect the equity premium significantly when the volatility of aggregate consumption growth remains constant. 3 An increase in stock market participants' labor income risk increases their bond holdings due to the precautionary savings motive, and tends to increase the equity premium, to lower the risk-free rate, or both. However, since nonparticipants now have lower income risk -which is the result of our calibration to make the aggregate consumption volatility remain close to the data -their precautionary saving motive weakens greatly. In sum, these two opposing effects offset each other and therefore the heterogeneity of income risk as a whole does not make a significant difference. In addition, heterogeneous elasticities of intertemporal substitution (EIS) do not improve the model's performance in matching asset return moments to the data. This result differs particularly from that of Guvenen (2009) , in which stock market participants take short positions in bonds, whereas in our model they take long positions. In Guvenen's production economy, non-participants' income volatility, which is perfectly correlated with the economy's output, is largely due to capital adjustment costs. The large income volatility and a low EIS increase non-participants' precautionary saving motive. Thus, in Guvenen (2009) , non-participants take long positions in bonds (i.e., save), and as the counter-party, participants take short positions (i.e., borrow). In reality, however, stock market participants are generally richer than non-participants and the rich tend to save more (Dynan et al., 2004and Carrol, 2002a ). In contrast, non-participants, who are relatively poor and likely to have a 2 For example, Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) have investigated real returns of equities for 39 markets for and found that the US equities had the highest real return of 4.3%, whereas the median is 0.8% for other countries, providing a support for the survival bias. Dimson et al. have examined the equity premia of 17 countries over a period since 1900 until current time (Dimson et al., 2002 (Dimson et al., , 2008 (Dimson et al., , 2011 and found that the historical equity premium is equal to 5.3% in the US, 4.0% in the rest of countries, and 4.5% for the world. These values are low compared with 6.2% over 1889-1978 in the U.S. documented by Mehra and Prescott (1985) . They have also forecasted that the equity premium in the future will be around 3 À 3 1 2 % for the world (Dimson et al. (2011) , see also Lettau et al. (2008) ). 3 We also compute equilibrium asset returns with large income shocks in Model I without matching the volatility of aggregate consumption growth with the data and show that large income shocks do not raise the equity premium but lower the riskfree rate (Section 5.2).
higher demand for liquidity, are likely to borrow, i.e., take short positions in bonds. In our model the precautionary motive of nonparticipants is not so strong and they take short positions in bonds, which is a more accurate reflection of reality.
We investigate the effect of borrowing (or liquidity) constraints on asset pricing moments in our context. 4 To do this, we introduce the borrowing and short-sale restrictions in Model I. We show that if the agents' preferences are represented by a time-separable expected utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preference then equilibrium asset returns are similar to those in Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994 We also discuss practical implications of our model. As mentioned previously, our two-period model has limitations in studying long horizon effects or business cycles. However, we can still draw conclusions which can provide insights on the current financial markets. In Section 5 we study implications of our model for the potential change in asset pricing moments that have occurred since 2000 and also discuss effects of business cycles on asset returns.
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Overall, we believe that our unifying framework will offer insights -at least to the extent possible by one of the simplest tractable models -to improve understanding of the implications for asset pricing of uninsurable income risk, limited stock market participation, heterogeneous income volatilities, and heterogeneous preferences. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our simple asset pricing model. Section 3 presents the numerical results of asset pricing moments and other relevant variables in our model (Models 0, I, and II). Section 4 provides the results of heterogeneity in agents' labor income and preferences (Models I 0 and II 0 ). Section 5 considers borrowing constraints and labor income volatility. We also consider the practical implications in this section. Section 6 offers concluding thoughts. Appendix A and B present a derivation of analytic results and numerical methods. Finally, in Appendix C we summarize all the models we study in this paper for readers to refer. In addition, we present the asset pricing results in Section 3 and 4 by using a consolidated table.
The model
The model that we consider in this paper is a two-period pure exchange economy with two agents, agent 1 and agent 2. A single consumption good serves as a numeraire in the economy. The preference of agent k (k ¼ 1; 2) is characterized by the following Epstein-Zin utility function (Epstein and Zin, 1989) :
where c k 0 and c k 1 refer to agent k's consumption at time 0 and 1, respectively, b is the subjective time discount factor common across the two agents, c k is agent k's coefficient of relative risk aversion, and 1=ð1 À k Þ is equal to his/her elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
A stock, tradable in the economy's financial market, generates dividends in each period. The total amount of dividends from the stock is equal to D 0 at time 0 and takes one of two possible values,
at time 1, depending upon the realization of nature. The aggregate number of shares of the stock is normalized to be 1. Agent k is endowed with x k shares of the stock at the beginning, so
Both agents are endowed with shares of another asset, which may or may not be tradable in the financial market depending on assumptions that we will make explicit later. Regardless of our assumptions, we will refer to it as a non-tradable asset. The non-tradable asset can be interpreted either as a claim to a stream of labor income or as ownership of a proprietorship. Income from the non-tradable asset is equal to I 0 at time 0 and becomes equal to I 0 h or I 0 l; h > l at time 1, again depending upon the realization of nature. We also normalize the non-tradable asset's aggregate number of shares to be equal to 1. For simplicity, we will call agent k's share of the non-traded asset his/ her labor income share and denote its value at the beginning by L k . Note that we have assumed that non-tradable parts of the two agents' incomes are perfectly correlated. Guvenen (2009) has also made the same assumption; relaxation of the assumption does not change the results of this paper significantly. Gomes and Michaelides (2008) did consider the heterogeneity of labor income shock; however, the heterogeneity did not contribute to explaining asset pricing moments.
6
In addition to shares of the stock, risk-free bonds are traded in the financial market. The bonds are zero-coupon bonds, paying 1 unit of the consumption good at time 1. The aggregate supply of bonds is equal to 0. We assume that each agent's initial endowment of bonds is equal to 0.
Thus, four states of the world exist in our economy, and these will be denoted by ðu; hÞ; ðu; lÞ; ðd; hÞ, and ðd; lÞ, respectively (Figs. 1 and 2). p i;j is the probability of state i; j at time 1. Clearly,
The sequence of events and activities at time 0 is as follows. First, dividends from the stock and income from the non-traded asset are paid. Second, the trading of shares and bonds takes place in the financial market. Third, each agent consumes.
An equilibrium of the economy consists of prices and choices at time 0: the asset prices, S 0 and B 0 , and agents' consumption choic- 
The conditions for financial market clearing are given as follows:
If these conditions are satisfied, then the market for the consumption good will also clear by Walras' law. We now state the conditions for the equilibrium as follows:
1. Given ðS 0 ; B 0 Þ, each agent obtains maximum utility with his/her choice under his/her budget constraints given in (2) and (3). 2. The financial market clears as in (4) and (5).
Analysis
Despite the simplicity of our model economy, in general, there is no closed-form expression for its equilibrium, as in other incomplete market general equilibrium models.
7 Thus, we must rely on a numerical method (B). In this section we will use the numerical method to derive asset prices and the consumption and investment choices. We will also discuss their implications for the equity premium, the risk-free rate, the volatility of the equity return, and the mean and volatility of the consumption growth rate.
The baseline cases: Model 0 and Model I
We explain the baseline models, Models 0 and I in this section. Model 0 provides the complete market case in which claims to labor income are freely traded in the financial market so that risk in labor income is perfectly hedgeable. Model I corresponds to the case in which claims to labor income are non-tradable. Shares of the stock are freely traded among agents in both models. Thus, both agents are participants in the stock market.
The time between the two periods in our model is set to be 1 year, which is generally the interval over which the equity premium is generally estimated. We display our choice of parameter values for the baseline cases in Table 1 .
The correlation between the dividend process and the labor income process is set to be 0.4 as in Dittmar et al. (2014) . We set D 0 ¼ 0:33 and I 0 ¼ 0:67 to match the stylized fact that labor income constitutes two thirds of aggregate income. The mean growth rate of dividends and that of labor income are set to be 1.12% and 1.94%, respectively, as in Dittmar et al. (2014) . The standard deviation of the dividend growth rate and the labor income growth rate are taken to be 8.0% and 1.0%, respectively, to match the volatility of the aggregate consumption growth rate.
8 With the choice of parameter values, the mean growth rate and the standard deviation of aggregate consumption are computed to be 1.73% and 2.96%, respectively. In the baseline models both agents participate in the stock market; however in other models, which we will explain later, agent 2 may not participate in the market. To provide results comparable with those of other models we set
determine the relative shares of labor income of the two agents and are set to be 0.2 and 0.8, respectively, as in Guvenen (2009) . The literature has not reached a consensus about the magnitude of EIS. Hansen and Singleton (1982) , Guvenen (2009) , and VissingJorgensen (2002) estimate EIS to be larger than 1; however, Barsky et al. (1997) and Campbell (1999) provide estimates well below 1. Researchers of asset pricing also vary widely in their choice of the value of EIS. For example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) take 1.5 for EIS, and Gomes and Michaelides (2008) set (endogenous) stock market non-participants' EIS to be 0.1 and (endogenous) participants' to be 0.4. Guvenen (2009) calibrates stock market non-participants' EIS to be 0.1 and participants' to be 0.3. To acknowledge this diversity of opinion, we choose a wide range of values for EIS. Table 2 shows the risk-free rate and the equity premium with the baseline parameter values given in Table 1 . 9 The risk-free rate and the equity premium in ''Data'' in Table 2 are from Guvenen (2009). The time period for his data is from 1890 to 1991. 8 The standard deviation of the dividend growth rate is equal to 10.82% and that of the labor income growth rate is equal to 3.46% in Dittmar et al. (2014) . With these values, however, our model fails to generate the historical aggregate consumption growth volatility of around 3% unless dividend growth and labor income growth are assumed to be significantly negatively correlated. 9 For convenience, we present a consolidated table, Table C .22 in Appendix C, to
show the results of all the models in Sections 3 and 4.
Model 0, the complete market case, generates results comparable to those in the previous literature (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Lucas, 1994) . For example, Lucas (1994) generated an equity premium equal to 0.3% and a risk-free rate equal to 9.5%, which are close to those in our model with c ¼ 2 and EIS = 0.5. Our model generates a lower risk-free rate of 4.39%, since we assume a higher value (0.99) for subjective discount factor b than Lucas.
The results for Model I are not significantly different from those for Model 0. This fact implies that non-tradability of claims to labor income does not explain the equity premium puzzle. The implication is also consistent with the previous literature; e.g., Telmer (1993) demonstrated that an incomplete market model with heterogeneous agents and unhedgeable income shocks does not generate a result significantly different from that of the corresponding complete market model.
The non-tradability of labor income implies two aspects of reality. The first is that the idiosyncratic risk in agents' labor income is not hedgeable in the market. The second is that individuals cannot borrow against their future labor income; this restriction is usually modeled as borrowing (or liquidity) constraints. For the discussion in this section, we focused on the first aspect of non-tradability of labor income. We will consider the second aspect in Section 5.1.
Limited stock market participation (Model II)
As initially suggested by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) , limited stock market participation has been considered a candidate solution to the equity premium puzzle (He and Modest, 1995; Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Gomes and Michaelides, 2008; Guvenen, 2009) . Following this idea we consider Model II in this section; in this model labor income is not traded and agent 2 does not participate in the stock market.
This model generates a remarkable difference in asset returns compared to the Models 0 and I, particularly in equity premium (Table 3) . When c ¼ 10, the generated equity premium is higher than 4%. This is still lower than implied by the data, but is higher by about 3% than in Model 0 or in Model I. The risk-free rate is lower than 2.4% if EIS greater than or equal to 0.5. Table 4 shows agent 1's optimal portfolio choice in Models I and II. If agent 2 had participated in the stock market, he/she would have taken about a half share of the stock (Model I); i.e., dividend risk is shared almost equally between the two agents. Because the dividend risk is not shared in Model II, agent 1 requires a higher risk premium to hold the entire share of the stock. Guvenen (2009) derived a similar result.
Investments in bonds also differ between Models I and II; agent 1 invests more in bonds in Model I than in Model II. In Guvenen (2009) the stock market participants take short positions in bonds, since their EIS is higher than non-participants'. We will consider heterogeneous preferences later in Section 4.2; however, the cause of the positive bond investment by agent 1 should be explained. In our models, both agents have a precautionary saving motive due to their unhedgeable labor income risks. However, the participants bear additional risk from investment in the stock, so their incentive to smooth consumption by increasing savings is much higher than it is for non-participants if both agents have the same EIS, as they do in Model II. This high saving motive results in agent 1's positive position in bonds.
We report the Sharpe ratio and consumption volatility in Table 5 . The Sharpe ratio in the U.S. data is approximately 0.32 (Guvenen, 2009) , whereas the Sharpe ratio in Model II with c ¼ 10 is about 0.52. The maximum Sharpe ratio generated by Bansal and Yaron (2004) is 0.73, which is larger than in our model. They explained that the high Sharpe ratio is caused both by the Epstein and Zin preferences and by the long-run risk component in their model. Our high Sharpe ratio also might be due to the agents' Epstein-Zin preferences. The volatilities of stock market participants' and non-participants' consumption in the U.S. data are about 3.6% and 1.4%, respectively (Gomes and Michaelides, 2008) . In Model II, stock market participants' consumption volatility is around 5.76%, much higher than non-participants' consumption volatility of 1.01% (Table 5 ). Our result is comparable with that of Gomes and Michaelides (2008) : in their model the volatilities of stock market participants' and non-participants' consumption are 5.02% and 2.05%, respectively. In this section we show that the result in Section 3.2 is sensitive to the assumed labor income shares of stock market participants and non-participants. The previously assumed distribution, 0.2:0.8, of initial endowments of labor income reflects the population sizes, but not the magnitudes of labor income. It is wellknown that stock market participants are generally richer and earn much higher per capita labor income than non-participants. Therefore, though Guvenen (2009) has used a distribution of 0.2:0.8, his assumption does not necessarily coincide with the empirical distribution of labor income.
To understand the effect of the distributional assumption on asset returns we recompute the equilibria in Models 0, I, and II by changing the initial distribution of labor income to 0.5:0.5 as in Table 6 . Table 7 shows the equilibrium under the new distributional assumption.
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The equilibrium for Model 0 does not show any change. The distributional assumption does not affect the equilibrium asset returns in a complete market model, which allows perfect risk sharing between agents. The equilibrium returns for Model I are still almost the same as those for Model 0, as noted earlier. The risk-free rate is slightly higher under the new distributional assumption than under the old one; participants' precautionary saving motive decreases as labor income increase. Limited stock market participation explains about 1% less of the equity premium under the new distributional assumption than under the previous assumption. To see why, see Table 8 , which shows optimal portfolio choices.
In Model I under the new distributional assumption agent 1 holds a much larger share of the stock than under the previous assumption. For instance, when c ¼ 10 and EIS = 0.5, the share is 0.680 in Table 8 , whereas it is 0.488 in Table 4 . Therefore, the difference between agent 1's stock position in Model I and that in Model II is smaller and thus the equity premium is lower in Model II under the new distributional assumption. The result is consistent with Gomes and Michaelides (2008) 's argument that limited stock market participation explains almost none of the high equity premium if non-participants' wealth is much smaller than that of participants. Table 9 shows the volatility of the consumption growth rate for each agent under the new distributional assumption. The volatility of agent 1's consumption growth rate in Model II is now much smaller than under the previous assumption. This decrease occurs because the risk of agent 1's stock position in Model II is considerably hedged due to the larger share of his/her labor endowment under the new distributional assumption. 
Heterogeneous agents
In this section, we consider heterogeneity in agents' labor income risks and their EIS's.
Heterogeneous labor income processes
We first consider heterogeneity in labor income risk. In particular, we consider the case in which stock market participants' labor income is more volatile than that of non-participants. We will show that the effect of the labor income heterogeneity on asset returns is not significant if we choose new parameter values such that the growth rate of aggregate consumption in the model is close to that in the data. 0 . The equity premium and the risk-free rate differ only slightly between the cases with heterogeneous income risk and with homogeneous income risk. In case with heterogeneous income risk the equity premium is higher and the risk-free rate is only slightly lower than in the Base case with homogeneous income risk. The increase in income risk of the stock market participants increased their precautionary saving motive, and this tends to reduce the risk-free rate. However, the effect is small since we calibrated the parameter values to closely match the volatility of the aggregate consumption growth rate in the data. The non-participants now have lower income risk, and thus the aggregate demand for bonds is not much different from Model I and Model II, and the change in the risk-free rate is small. The combination of the increase in agent 1's income risk and the reduction of agent 2's income risk generates an equity premium only 0.02% higher in Model I 0 than in the Base case with homogeneous income risk. In Model II 0 , in which agent 2 does not participate in the stock market, the increased income risk of agent 1 causes a larger increase (0.17%) in the equity premium than in the Base case.
Thus far, we have calibrated the model parameters to match the aggregate consumption volatility closely with that in the data; this calibration makes the income volatility of non-participants artificially low. In Section 5.2 we will consider larger income volatilities than that we have so far, without trying to match the aggregate consumption volatility.
Heterogeneous preferences
Now we introduce heterogeneity in agents' preferences into our model. Guvenen (2009) has considered heterogeneous preferences in his model, in which stock market participants' EIS is equal to 0.3 and non-participants' EIS is equal to 0.1, so that participants' EIS is three times as large as non-participants'. Gomes and Michaelides (2008) also investigated a model in which stock market participants have larger EIS and relative risk aversion than do nonparticipants. Here we will consider three cases, EIS 1 /EIS 2 : 0.3/0.1, 0.6/0.2, and 0.9/0.3, keeping the ratio of EIS 1 to EIS 2 at 3/1 following Guvenen (2009) and Blundell et al. (1994) . Table 12 shows the risk-free rate and the equity premium in equilibrium with heterogeneous preferences. The table shows that the risk-free rate depends substantially on EIS's. The equity premium, however, does not change significantly with the introduction of heterogeneous preferences, suggesting that heterogeneous EIS's play a negligible role in generating a large equity premium.
This result is consistent with that of Gomes and Michaelides (2008) but quite different from that of Guvenen (2009) . In Gomes and Michaelides (2008) the heterogeneity in agents' preferences does not contribute significantly to generation of a high equity premium; 11 instead, heterogeneous preferences make agents adopt different wealth-accumulation strategies; an agent with a high EIS accumulates larger wealth than an agent with a low EIS. In the model of Guvenen (2009) non-participants with a low EIS have stronger incentive to smooth consumption than participants with a high EIS, so non-participants take long positions in bonds. The participants with short positions in bonds are highly leveraged and therefore require a high premium on the return of the stock. In contrast, in our model, non-participants' precautionary saving motive is not so high, even when stock market participants' EIS is higher than non-participants', so that non-participants take short positions in bonds and participants take long positions (Table 13) . 
Other issues and practical implications

Borrowing constraints
In reality people are constrained in their ability to borrow against their future labor income. We study the effect of borrowing constraints on asset returns in this subsection. Following Gomes and Michaelides (2008) we consider the following strict form of borrowing constraints:
Borrowing constraints can be of several types; e.g., Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994) considered models in which borrowing limits depend on agents' income.
12 Both authors have concluded that the borrowing constraints contribute little to matching asset returns. Here we assume the strict form of borrowing constraints and investigate their effect. Equilibrium outcomes with the borrowing constraints are shown in Table 14 , with the parameter values in Table 1 . The second column in the table shows the outcomes for the case with c ¼ 2 and EIS ¼ 0:5, i.e., the agents' preferences are equivalent to those represented by the CRRA utility function with c ¼ 2. This case generates outcomes quantitatively similar to those in Telmer (1993) and Lucas (1994) .
All the equilibria with c ¼ 10 in Model I of Table 14 have lower risk-free rates and higher equity premia than the corresponding equilibria in Table 2 and the ones in the second column in Table 14 . The risk-free rate with borrowing constraints decreases since the borrowing constraints reduce the supply for bonds. It is interesting to see that the equity premium in Model I in Table 14 is as high as it is in Model II, which is in contrast to the previous results in Section 3.1. To understand why, we look at both agents' portfolio choices (Table 15 ).
In the presence of borrowing constraints agent 2's investments in stock and in bonds are both equal to 0 in Model I. Agent 2 takes a small short position in bonds in Model II in the absence of borrowing constraints (Table 4) ; i.e., in both models, the agents' portfolio choices are almost similar to each other and thus the equity premia are also similar. Thus, the borrowing constraints and limited participation in our two-period economy generate similar consequences for equity premia. In the absence of borrowing constraints agent 2 uses the proceeds from a short sale of bonds to buy shares of the stock in Model I (Table 4 ). In the presence of the constraints the short sale is prohibited and agent 2 can invest in the stock only by saving labor income. However, the agent is liquidityconstrained not only for the purpose of investment in the stock but also for that of consumption; he/she would be willing to consume more from borrowing against future labor income which is expected to be higher than it is now, but he/she could not because of the borrowing constraints. Thus, the agent's investments in bonds and in stock are both zero and the agent would consume all of his/her current labor income.
High labor income risk
The volatility of labor income in our baseline parametrization has been set equal to 1.0%. The value is low considering empirical estimates (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2014) . We have chosen this value to match the volatility of the growth rate of aggregate consumption with that in the data. In this subsection we consider volatility higher than 1.0% and examine the equilibrium asset returns. Table 16 shows equilibrium outcomes with higher income volatility. We set the standard deviation of both agents' labor income to be 3.46% in Models I and II, adopting the survey result in Dittmar et al. (2014) . We also set the standard deviation of agent 1's labor income to be 5.7% and that of agent 2's to be 0.4% in Models I 0 and Model II 0 in an attempt to keep the volatility of the growth rate of aggregate consumption to the level in Dittmar et al. (2014) . All other parameter values are equal to those in the baseline case (Table 1) . With the new parameters, the standard deviation of the growth rate of aggregate consumption is 4.15% in the case with homogeneous income risk and 3.14% in the case with heterogeneous income risk; the values are higher than estimates from the data.
The difference between equilibrium asset returns in Model I (I 0 ) and Model II (II 0 ) is still much larger than that between equilibrium asset returns in Model 0 and Model I (I 0 ) (Table 16 ). This implies that market incompleteness caused by uninsurable labor income alone does not have a significant effect on asset returns, as previously demonstrated. As shown in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the existence of both -limited stock market participation and uninsurable labor income (or borrowing constraints as in 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Model II x 1 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Section 3.2, -generates a significant change in asset returns. Note also that, although we set the difference between the two agents' labor income risk to be larger than in Table 10 , heterogeneity in income risk still does not cause a significant difference in Table 16 .
Our simple two-agent model certainty has limitations: it cannot easily capture large idiosyncratic income risk. Large specific income shocks are consistent with a small aggregate shock in an economy that involves a large number of people, which our two-agent economy cannot accommodate. To partially overcome this difficulty we compute the equilibrium asset returns with significantly high income risk; here we allow the standard deviation of the aggregate consumption growth rate to differ substantially from its empirical estimates. Table 17 shows the equilibrium asset returns with volatility of labor income equal to 10%. The equity premium is high in the presence of high income risk; it is larger than 3.7% even in the complete market (Model 0), lower in Model I than in Model 0, and increases to a value larger than 4.6% in Model II. A similar result is obtained when labor income risk is heterogeneous. Increase in higher labor income risk increases the equity premium and decreases the risk-free rate. The effect of uninsurable income risk is to reduce the risk-free rate but not to raise the equity premium even when income risk is high. However, limited stock market participation both increases the equity premium and decreases the risk-free rate. The low risk-free rate with negative and large absolute values in Table 17 is due to large aggregate income risk.
The effect of heterogeneity in labor income risk is now more pronounced: the risk-free rate and the equity premium are higher for Models I 0 and II 0 than for Models I and II. This shows that the effect of the heterogeneity increases with the increase in risk of the aggregate consumption growth rate. Although our two-period model may not be used to study effects of business cycles, we can conjecture that the heterogeneity in labor income risk has a larger effect on asset returns in a recession when the risk of the aggregate consumption growth rate is higher, than in a boom.
Business cycles and correlation between dividend and labor income
Our two-period model is not ideal for studying the effects of business cycles on asset returns. However, in this subsection we attempt to mimic a boom and a recession by choosing the mean growth rates of dividend and labor income. We set the mean growth rate of both dividend and labor income to be 3% for a boom and À1% for a recession. We also set the correlation between growth rates of dividend and labor income to be 0 during the boom and 0.9 during the recession, reflecting the fact that correlation tends to be higher in recessions than in booms.
Estimated equilibrium asset returns in Table 18 suggest that the business cycles largely affects the risk-free rate. The risk-free rates in the recession take negative values; because people in this economy expect reduced dividends and labor income, they wish to save at time 0, and thus the risk-free rate is low. In particular, non-participants take smaller short positions in bonds in a recession than in a boom, even though we do not report magnitudes of their positions in bonds here. We observe a small counter-cyclical movement of the Sharpe ratio and a slightly higher equity premium in the recession; these changes are largely caused by the higher volatility of the aggregate consumption growth rate in the recession due to the higher correlation between growth rates of dividend and labor income.
Practical implications
The equity premium puzzle addresses the question of why the premium was so high in the past. It does not address the question of what will happen to the premium in the future. We have seen that the size and wealth of the population that participates in the stock market, as well as the borrowing constraints, are significant factors in determining the equity premium. In fact, the size and wealth of the population that participates in the stock market are not independent from the borrowing constraints: individuals with loose borrowing constraints are more likely to participate in the stock market than are individuals with tight borrowing constraints. We know that the participation rate has been increasing; about half of U.S. households became stock market participants by the early 2000s (Guvenen, 2009 , Investment Company Institute (2002 ). Furthermore, financial innovations have contributed to loosening individuals' borrowing limits. In this subsection we attempt to understand the effects of looser borrowing constraints and higher participation rates on asset returns. Table 19 shows equilibrium asset returns with different levels of borrowing constraints. The borrowing limit here refers to the limit on the short sale of bonds; other parameter values are teh same as in the baseline case (Table 1) . In Model I, the risk-free rate increases and the equity premium decreases as the borrowing limit increases, since agent 2's investment in the stock increases as the borrowing limit increases; this correlation shows that sharing of dividend risk between agents increases as borrowing constraint loosens. The results in Model II are essentially the same as in Table 3 , in which agent 2 does not participate in the stock market. Looser borrowing constraints do not help risk sharing if a group of agents is artificially banned from the stock market.
We next consider an increase in the rate of participation in the stock market with c ¼ 10 and EIS = 0.5 in Table 20 . As the participation rate increases from 0.2 to 0.3 and to 0.4, the equity premium decreases from 4.43%, to 3.99% and to 3.63%, respectively.
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Considering together the effects of the increasing borrowing limits and the increasing participation rate, we conjecture that the equity premium will decrease (e.g., Lettau et al. (2008) and Dimson et al. (2011) for the same prediction with different reasons).
Conclusion
We have studied the asset pricing implications of uninsurable income risk, limited stock market participation, heterogeneous income volatilities, and heterogeneous preferences by using a simple two-agent, two-period pure exchange economy. We have shown that the two-period model generates results similar to those of previous studies and is thus able to capture the essence of asset pricing, despite its obvious weakness in handling longterm risks.
In our model, limited stock market participation and borrowing constraints play a similar role in generating a high equity premium. For borrowing constraints to have a significant effect on the equity premium, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution must be separated from the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We have also shown that the effect of limited stock market participation on asset returns depends substantially on the distribution of wealth between stock market participants and non-participants.
The two-agent model cannot capture the fact that aggregate income risk can be small even though individuals have large idiosyncratic income shocks in the real world. Capturing this aspect requires a model with a large population of heterogeneous agents; we leave this task for future research.
Appendix A. Analytic computation
We show the derivation of closed-form equilibria with (i) a CARA utility function and (ii) a quadratic utility function, as well as the difficulty in deriving closed form equilibria with a CRRA utility function and an Epstein-Zin type utility function. We assume that both agents have the same preference parameters deriving the following computation.
A.1. The original problem and a new problem
The agent's problem can be stated as follows: The Lagrangian for agent k's problem is given by the following
From the first-order conditions we derive the following equations
The numerator in the left-hand side of Eq. (A.1) is the sum of marginal values of consumptions in states ðu; hÞ and ðu; lÞ. Thus, the ratio appearing in the equation can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time 0 and consumption in event u, which is composed of states ðu; hÞ and ðu; lÞ.
This interpretation suggests the following intuitively appealing approach to the agent's optimization problem. We first note that the following is valid at the optimum:
that is, consumption in state ði; jÞ is equal to the sum of the payoff
and income from the non-traded asset, L k I 0 j. Thus, the difference between consumption and income from the non-traded asset is the same across states ði; hÞ and ði; lÞ for i ¼ u; d. We will confine our attention to consumptions satisfying this property. 
I.e., c k i is equal to the common difference between consumption in the original problem and income from the non-traded asset in states ði; hÞ and ði; lÞ for i ¼ u; d. We now define a state-dependent utility function p i uð c i ; iÞ; i ¼ u; d by its derivative as follows:
ðA:5Þ
That is, p i uð c k i ; iÞ is a state-dependent utility function of c k i whose marginal utility function is equal to the sum of the marginal utility function of agent k in states ði; hÞ and ði; lÞ for i ¼ u; d. In other words we can transform the agent's utility function into another state-dependent function in which the income from the non-traded asset is treated as an exogenous random endowment and absorbed into the state-dependent utility function. Now we state a new problem, which is equivalent to Problem 1, as follows: 
From the definition (A.5) and Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) derived from the first-order conditions for Problem 1 0 , we derive the first-order conditions for Problem 1 as follows:
We can now derive optimal consumption for Problem 1 0 from the above first-order conditions:
Then, from (A.9) and budget constraints (A.6) and (A.7), we get an analytic solution to agent k's problem. Now that the market is similar to a complete one, the following single budget constraint will suffice.
ðA:10Þ Here p i;j =p i is the conditional probability of state j, conditional on the event that i will occur, for i ¼ u; d and j ¼ h; l. Thus, C k i can be interpreted as expected marginal utility of agent k's income from the non-traded asset conditional on event i. 
We now derive agent k's optimal consumption and portfolio as follows:
Now, we can compute equilibrium asset prices using the market-clearing conditions, (4) and (5). From the risk-free asset,
And from the risky asset, Without an explicit solution of agents' optimal choices, we also cannot derive an analytic form of equilibrium.
Appendix B. Numerical computation
We show the equations of the numerical computations in our model. With the utility function in (1), the Lagrangian for agent k's problem is given by the following
We obtain the following equations by manipulating the firstorder conditions.
: ðB:2Þ
Then we have four equations from two agents' optimization, and two equations from the market clearing conditions. Since we need to identify six variables, x 
À1
: ðB:3Þ
We obtain the following equations from agent 1's first-order conditions.
; ðB:4Þ Appendix C. Consolidated tables Table C .21 summarizes all the models we study in this paper. Table C .22 presents all the asset pricing results in Sections 3 and 4. 
